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BLD-267        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1573 
 ___________ 
 
 WILLIAM STAPLES, 
 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 WARDEN H.L. HUFFORD, Warden at FCI-SCH 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00184) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 23, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed September 18, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 William Staples appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 
 2 
 
U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In May 2005, Staples pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one 
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1); 924(g).  At 
sentencing in October 2005, the District Court classified Staples as a career offender 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on four 
Wisconsin state court convictions.  He was sentenced to 200 months of incarceration.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Staples’ 
contention that three of his Wisconsin convictions had been discharged, and therefore 
should not have been used to enhance his sentence under the ACCA.  United States v. 
Staples, No. 05-4037, 2007 WL 1140286, at *1 (7th Cir. 2007) (not precedential) (noting 
that “Staples presented no evidence that his rights were restored”).  Next, Staples filed a 
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, again alleging 
that he was improperly sentenced under the ACCA because Wisconsin, in discharging his 
convictions, had restored his right to possess firearms.  The District Court denied the 
§ 2255 motion and Staples did not appeal.  Thereafter, Staples filed numerous § 2255 
motions in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, all of which were dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because Staples did not have the required authorization to file a second or 
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successive § 2255 motion.  When Staples requested such authorization from the Seventh 
Circuit, it was denied.   
 Staples filed the instant § 2241 petition in January 2012.  The District Court 
dismissed the petition, holding that Staples failed to demonstrate that a motion under 
§ 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy.  Staples filed a timely notice of 
appeal.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
findings of fact.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  See 
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  A petitioner can seek relief 
under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  A 
§ 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot 
meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120, or 
because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve” provided under 
§ 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such as 
those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
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crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  Okereke, 307 
F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).  For example, in Dorsainvil, we 
allowed the petitioner to proceed under § 2241 because an intervening change in the law 
decriminalized conduct for which he had been convicted, and he had no earlier 
opportunity to challenge that conviction.  Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d at 251. 
 Staples claims that he was improperly classified as a career offender under the 
ACCA because three of his predicate Wisconsin convictions had been “discharged” and 
his right to possess firearms had been restored.  In support of this allegation, Staples 
relies on United States v. Vitrano, 405 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2005).  In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an ACCA sentencing 
enhancement must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his right to ship, 
transport, possess, or receive firearms specifically has been reinstated.  Id. at 510 (stating 
that an ACCA sentence enhancement is not permitted where a state “creates . . . a false 
sense of security” by “employ[ing] language in discharging a prisoner that will lull the 
individual into the misapprehension that civil rights have been restored to the degree that 
will permit him to possess firearms.”).  We conclude, however, that Staples’ challenge to 
his sentence under Vitrano is not the rare situation rendering § 2255 inadequate or 
ineffective.  Importantly, we note that Vitrano, which was issued several months before 
Staples was sentenced, cannot represent a change in law made after his § 2255 motion 
was adjudicated.  Thus, we conclude that the exception identified in Dorsainvil is 
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inapplicable here, and Staples may not evade the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 by 
seeking relief under § 2241.
1
 
 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.   
                                                 
1
 To the extent that Staples argues that he is innocent of the underlying § 922(g) firearms 
offense, we similarly conclude that the narrow “safety valve” provided under § 2255 does 
not apply.  In addition, we conclude that none of the other arguments raised in Staples’ 
§ 2241 petition entitle him to relief. 
